




Maxine C  Johnson 
ECONOMIC UPDATE: 
MONTANA'S OUTLOOK AT 
MIDYEAR
Heiko de B. W ijnholds 
NORTH DAKOTA WHEAT POOL: 
WHAT WENT WRONG
Paul L  Polzin










SUMMER 1980 VOLUME 18 NUMBER 2
3 GR INSSP SL 1Y OR 0JQORO XVGXOSR/
0 B 9 1$ 1 9 : 5 4
3OV IXSV 1YV GY SL 1Y OR GRJ 4ISRSQOI GVIN/
: 0 D 4 2$ 8 6
4JOXSV/ : 0 E 9 5 0 9 4 6 0
5VGTNOI 3 OMR/ 8 0 2 1 0 3 C 4 A 5 0 5 4 2 E
AN :SR X G R G 1Y OR YGVX VP TYHPO N J H XN 1YV GY SL
1Y OR GRJ 4ISRSQOI GVIN INSSP SL 1Y OR 0 J Q O R
O XVGXOSR O G VZOI SL XN BROZ V OX SL :SRXGRG :O SYPG$ AN
ISRX RX SL XNO TYHPOIGXOSR Q G H V TVSJYI J OXNSYX XN
ISR RX SL XN TYHPO N V GRJ SV GYXNSV $ VST V IV JOX NSYPJ H
MOZ R XS XN YGVX VP GRJ OX ISRXVOHYXSV LSV XN Y SL GR
TYHPO N J QGX VOGP$
2SRX RX SL XN YGVX VP V LP IX XN ZO GRJ STOROSR SL XN
GYXNSV GRJ J S RSX R I GVOP V TV RX XNS SL XN 1YV GY XN
INSSP SL 1Y OR SV XN BROZ V OX $
ISRJ IPG TS XGM TGOJ GX :O SYPG : A .- ($
AN :SR X G R G 1Y OR YGVX VP O GZGOPGHP S R :OIVSLOPQ LVSQ
BROZ V OX :OIVSLOPQ ) $ H J$ 0 R R 0VHSV : P - ,$
AN YH IVOTXOSR VGX LSV XN YGVX VP GV ,$ T V GV $ LSV
X S GV ,$ LSV XNV GV GRJ ($ T V ORMP O Y $
TVORX SL XN GVXOIP GV RSX GZGOPGHP HYX GJJOXOSRGP ISTO SL XN
YGVX VP Q G H IYV J GX ($ T V IST $
0PP ORUYOVO V MGVJORM YH IVOTXOSR TYHPOIGXOSR XI$ NSYPJ H
GJJV J XS/
:SR X G R G 1Y OR YGVX VP
1YV GY SL 1Y OR GRJ 4ISRSQOI GVIN
BROZ V OX SL :SRXGRG
:O SYPG : A .- (
 (, ..(





Maxine C. Johnson 
ECONOMIC UPDATE: 
MONTANA’S OUTLOOK AT MIDYEAR . . .  5
Heiko de B. Wijnholds 
NORTH DAKOTA WHEAT POOL: 
WHAT WENT WRONG . . .  8
Paul E. Polzin 
POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE: 
AN UPDATE . . .  14
ECONOMISTS’ NOTEBOOK . . .  19
Mary L. Lenihan 
GOLD: THE BEGINNING OF 













, , , 
At an economic outlook seminar 
presented in Kalispell on June 3, Maxine 
Johnson discussed the current outlook for 
the state economy. This article is based on 
that presentation.
N o t long ago, a writer on the editorial page of The 
W a ll S tree t J o u rn a l suggested that a freeze be 
imposed on economic forecasting. No more 
economic projections or forecasts should be 
permitted. The writer stated that economists could 
then be freed for more productive work, and he 
cited shortages of labor in appliance repair, 
plumbing, police protection, and garbage collec 
tion.
Some economists, he noted, might insist on 
continuing in their chosen professions, but he had 
a recommendation as to how to keep them from 
making forecasts. It's easy, he said. Congress could 
simply pass a law that any economist caught 
forecasting would be forced to recite, in public, all 
his or her earlier forecasts.
My evaluation of the prospects for the Montana 
economy during the decade of the eighties has not 
changed since it appeared in the Spring 1980 issue 
of the Q u a rte rly . I am, however, much more 
pessimistic about this year than I was a few months 
ago.
The current recession may have begun in 
Montana late in 1979. Preliminary estimates from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, released in 
early May, indicate that both total personal income 
and per capita income declined slightly last year, 
after adjustment for inflation. Each estimate, when 
put into 1972 dollars, is one percent below the 1978 
figure.
At the present time, there is no consensus among 
economists as to how severe the recession will be, 
or how long it will last. Each time new economic 
data are released, the view with respect to the 
downturn becomes more gloomy. However, as of 
late May, the following assumptions were fre 
quently used by forecasters at the national level:
1980 inflation rate near 10 percent.
Decline in U.S. economic activity during first 
three quarters, recovery beginning in 
fourth quarter.
Gross national product from 2 to 3 percent 
below 1979, after adjustment for inflation.
Maximum of one million new housing starts.
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The inflation rate used here refers to the implicit 
price deflator for the gross national product. The 
consumer price index, which is more frequently 
quoted in the press, is often higher than the 
deflator and might average as much as 12 percent 
over 1979 this year.
The two most crucial matters for the Montana 
economy this year are the condition of the U. S. 
housing market and state agricultural output and 
prices. Markets for western Montana's forest 
industry output—lumber, plywood and board 
products—are heavily dependent upon the hous 
ing industry. In eastern Montana, agriculture 
continues to be the leading source of income and is 
of overwhelming importance in many areas.
Everyone knows the U. S. housing market is in 
trouble, and that means western Montana also has 
problems. Most current projections now foresee 
around 1.0 million new housing starts in the 
country this year. That figure may be compared to 
the 2.0 million starts in 1978 and the 1.7 million last 
year. It would make 1980 a worse year for housing 
than 1975, when almost 1.2 million units were 
started. According to the U. S. Department of 
Commerce, there was over a 10 months' supply of 
new houses unsold in the United States at the end 
of March. That was the largest inventory since the 
Department began keeping records seventeen 
years ago.
As a result of the disastrous housing market, 
things have been grim in western Montana for the 
last few months. At one point, almost 4,000 wood 
products industry workers were unemployed. 
Some now have gone back to work on a temporary 
basis. Nevertheless, the immediate outlook is not 
very encouraging. If the paper market declines and 
the demand for chips falls, things will get worse.
The interest rate on mortgages is falling and may 
go lower, but the current large supply of unsold 
housing plus the recession probably mean a slow 
recovery in homebuilding. Data Resources, Inc. 
projects a total of about 1.5 million housing starts in 
1981, working up to 1.9 million units in 1982. It may 
be next spring before the forest industries in 
western Montana feel the effects of the upturn and 
even then, 1.5 million new housing starts in 1981 
would mean only an average year.
In the past, agriculture has sometimes served as a 
bulwark against recession in eastern Montana. That 
appears not to be happening this year. Cash 
receipts from farm marketings (including govern 
ment payments) declined in 1979, and real net farm 
income was down considerably, mostly because of 
a smaller grain crop. Wheat prices this spring are
higher than they were last fall, but the crop may 
again be below average in size, because of slightly 
reduced acreage and the lack of rain in eastern 
Montana. Cattle prices currently are lower than 
they were a year ago. Dry weather and poor range 
conditions forced some ranchers to sell off part of 
their herds. Total cash receipts in 1980 may be lower 
than in 1979. With farm production costs rising 
rapidly, net income is likely to fall again.
Other industries which are important to Mon 
tana because they export goods and services, or 
otherwise bring money into the state, have mixed 
prospects for the next few months.
“ I am much more pessimistic 
about this year than I was a 
few months ago.”
There is some good news. Oil and gas exploration 
activity continues at a good pace, benefiting the 
eastern part of the state especially, but also the 
Overthrust Belt area in western Montana. Coal 
production may increase somewhat, although 
some consumers of Montana coal are cutting back 
orders as a result of the recession. Colstrip 3 and 4 
should keep total heavy construction activity at 
reasonably high levels. There currently are around 
600 workers employed on those projects and the 
number will increase during the year. All this will 
help eastern Montana, especially the Billings area.
On the other hand, employment figures reflect 
the cutback in mining and smelting employees by 
The Anaconda Company, announced in January. 
Those cuts were attributed to increased efficiency, 
not to a decline in production. Since then, copper 
prices have slipped because of declining demand 
by the housing, appliance, and automobile in 
dustries. That could mean further layoffs if output 
in the Butte area is reduced. The Anaconda 
aluminum plant at Columbia Falls, which employs 
about 1,300 workers, faces better prospects; any 
layoffs there are likely to be limited.
Montana's tourist industry, especially important 
in western Montana, suffered from a decline in 
travelers last year; some further decrease may 
occur in 1980. A national recession plus high gas 
prices probably mean fewer out-of-state visitors. 
Efforts to attract people from nearby areas and to 
persuade more Montanans to vacation in the state 
may help. Visitors who do come may stay longer in 
one place.
Federal government employment in March was 
down substantially from March 1979; if the decline
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Table 1
Estimates of Labor Income 
and Total Personal Income in Montana, 
1978-1980
Sources: 1978 and 1979 — U. S . Bureau o f  Economic A n a ly s is ; 1980 — Bureau o f
Business and Economic Research, U n iv e rs ity  o f  Montana.
Note: Income f ig u re s  d e fla te d  by the  im p l ic i t  p r ic e  d e f la to r  fo r  personal
consumption e xp end itu res .
continues, the total earnings of federal employees 
also will decrease this year. With the layoffs by the 
Milwaukee Road and the nationwide recession, 
railroads are not likely to provide increased 
employment or earnings this year.
Given these prospects for Montana's basic or 
export industries, plus high inflation rates which 
cut into the purchasing power of consumers, it is 
clear that a good many retail firms and other 
businesses may experience declines in their activity 
this year. One indicator of how things are: although 
employment in retail and wholesale trade in 
creased modestly over last year's severe winter, the
average number of hours worked per employee in 
February and March was about 7 percent lower 
than during the same months last year.
Keeping all this in mind, I would expect total real 
labor income or earnings in Montana this year to 
decline, by as much as 6 percent (table 1). But there 
are two other components of total personal 
income: property income (rent, dividends, and 
interest) and transfer payments. Property income 
may increase slightly and transfer payments likely 
will grow significantly. Payments such as un 
employment insurance are designed to increase 
during periods of recession, and they will do so. 
Social security payments are scheduled to go up on 
July 1. As a result, total personal income, after 
adjustment for inflation, may only decline by about 
2 percent. Because our population is growing, real 
per capita income (average income per person 
after adjustment for inflation) will decline more 
than 2 percent.
For many individuals and businesses, 1980 will be 
a painful year. Conditions will vary from one area to 
another, and from one industry to another. Eastern 
Montana will fare better than the western part of 
the state, although it may feel this recession more 
than some earlier ones. Nevertheless, I remain 
convinced that better times are ahead for Montana 
in the 1980s. □
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Hi 11Ions  o f  1972 D o lla rs  -  P ercen t Change -
1978 1979 1980 1979-79 1979-90
Tota l Labor Income 2 ,5 * *  2 ,*4 6  2,310 -4  - 9
T o ta l Personal Income 3,817 3,570 3 ,*9 0  -1  -9
HEIKO DE B. WIJNHOLDS
D irect export marketing of grain is a topic which 
has received considerable attention in the last 
several years. Growing wheat surpluses, rising 
costs, lower prices, and more competitive foreign 
markets have led producers to consider alternative 
channels of distribution. Producer pools is one 
such alternative.
The North Dakota Wheat Pool was established as 
an experimental venture in January 1976 with the 
aim to undertake the export marketing of identity- 
preserved North Dakota wheat directly to foreign 
buyers. The idea was to preserve the identity, 
quality, and image of North Dakota wheat on the 
one hand and eliminate reselling middlemen on 
the other. However, the Pool confronted a number 
of handicaps, and it ceased operation in August 
1977. What follows is an examination of the Pool's 
operation and why it was unsuccessful.
The International Setting
During the period of the North Dakota Wheat 
Pool's existence there was real concern among 
wheat producers about falling prices and growing 
surpluses. This was one of the major reasons for the 
Pool's formation. At present (May 1980) there is 
similar concern—this time galvanized by the 
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The grain embargo has both short-run im 
plications for U.S. grain exporters and possible 
long-run effects. Countries such as the Soviet 
Union, the People's Republic of China (mainland 
China), and even Japan may feel that they are or 
have been too dependent on the United States and
8
its foreign policies. Hence they may wish to 
diversify their suppliers. From the standpoint of 
other nations, the reliability of the United States as a 
major foodstuff supplier may be at stake. And, with 
it, the viability of U.S. export operations and the 
farmer's income.
The current situation raises several questions. 
What role will U.S. multinational corporations play 
in actively promoting U.S. grain exports? To what 
extent are our main competitors (other grain- 
producing nations and foreign grain distributors) 
going to benefit from the gap left by the United 
States? How will U.S. distributor cooperatives and 
farmers respond? Will this make direct export 
marketing more feasible or politically more pop 
ular? These considerations and related inter 
national and political developments, such as oil 
prices and inflation, pose a serious challenge to U.S. 
grain exporters.
In this context the role of alternative channels of 
distribution for U.S.wheat exports may have to be 
reevaluated. At the very least, strategies will have to 
be devised by all concerned to ensure that the 
United States remains a major and dependable 
exporter of wheat. The alternatives, growing 
surpluses, lower production, more support, or 
lower prices seem unacceptable from both an 
economic and a political viewpoint.
Agricultural Marketing
The marketing of wheat and other agricultural 
products differs from the procedures used for 
manufactured products. The international market 
structure, in particular, may appear to be complex if 
not confusing. In addition to the marketing of the 
actual product, in this case wheat, there are markets 
for facilitating various additional services, such as 
the transportation, storage, handling, and finan 
cing of the grain. The North Dakota Wheat Pool was 
only concerned with the actual buying and selling 
of the wheat.
There are three methods usually used to 
purchase agricultural products on the international 
market. The public tender system is the procedure 
used by foreign governments to invite sellers to 
offer for sale specified quantities and qualities of a 
particular commodity. The private tender system is 
similar, only the buyer is a private concern rather 
than a government agency. In the open market 
system, direct negotiations are made between 
buyers and sellers. The North Dakota Wheat Pool 
was involved in each type of international 
marketing method.
The North Dakota Experiment
Background
Cooperative agricultural ventures are a long 
standing tradition in North Dakota. The Nonpar 
tisan League, founded there before World War I, 
actively opposed railroads and other large cor 
porate interests. League members, mostly farmers, 
felt that the freight rates charged to transport their 
grain to out-of-state mills were excessive, and that 
privately-owned banks discriminated against small 
farmers. The League advocated instead a program 
of state-owned banks, grain elevators, packing 
plants, and marketing facilities. Two state-owned 
institutions founded during this period, the North 
Dakota State M ill and Elevator and the Bank of 
North Dakota, still exist, and were used to aid the 
North Dakota Wheat Pool in its operation. Farmers 
in other Great Plains states and the Midwest also 
had cooperative marketing ventures during the 
early part of the century, but North Dakota is 
unique in that the state-owned institutions from 
the earlier era remain.
Organization
The founders of the North Dakota Wheat Pool 
hoped to obtain better net prices for farmers 
through direct marketing efforts to foreign buyers. 
Farmers made voluntary wheat commitments in 
terms of volume; each committed a specified 
number of bushels to the Pool. Pool members 
elected a steering committee, which oversaw the 
Pool's activities.
The Pool delegated the responsibilities of wheat 
storage and handling to private companies. The 
Pool's broker facilitated the general marketing 
transactions. Nonprofit organizations such as the 
North Dakota State Wheat Commission, Great 
Plains Wheat Inc., and Western Wheat Associates 
provided promotional and informational 
assistance. Administrative and some marketing 
tasks were undertaken by representatives of North 
Dakota State Mill and Elevator. This agency 
sometimes made direct contact with buyers.
The wheat offered by the Pool was hard red 
spring wheat and durum. These two types are also 
available from other states, but, obviously, the 
emphasis here was on the wheat's North Dakota 
origin.
Customers
Although the United States exports wheat to almost 
every major region of the world, the efforts of the
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North Dakota Wheat Pool were concentrated 
mainly on countries in North Africa, Western 
Europe, and to some extent the Middle East and 
Asia. The Pool had to operate under certain 
constraints. For instance, the Pool could not sell to 
resellers, and the wheat purchased by the buyer 
had to be used for human consumption or for 
storage. It was difficult for the Pool to sell grain 
under government tender, as the wheat classes 
available were usually not of the exact specified 
quality desired for the tenders. Nevertheless, a sale 
was made to Tunisia under the Food For Peace 
Program, the first durum sale under this program.
Originally it was also the intention of the pool to 
approach mainly the small buyers of wheat, as their 
needs would be limited and thus more attuned to 
the limited supply that the Pool had to offer. 
Unfortunately certain problems arose that 
necessitated contacts with larger buyers in some 
instances. Most of the smaller buyers had to 
contend with a lack of available storage space. 
Another problem was the cost of holding inven 
tories for any period of time. For such buyers it was 
more advantageous to buy from larger trading 
corporations which could fulfill all these functions 
and had the required facilities.
As far as large buyers were concerned, their 
needs were usually substantial, and even if the Pool 
could provide their needs for a certain period of 
time, it could not do so on a continuous basis. Most 
of these buyers and even some of the smaller 
buyers preferred an assured supply of wheat. This is 
especially true where special wheat has been
offered for sale, as in the case of the North Dakota 
classes.
Specific customer preferences posed certain 
problems for the Pool, but at the same time also 
presented certain opportunities. For instance, the 
North Dakota wheat varieties are usually higher 
priced because of higher quality, particularly in the 
protein content of the wheat. Many buyers, 
however, are very price-conscious and are not too 
concerned with quality, which meant that those 
buyers could not be enticed to purchase the more 
expensive North Dakota wheat classes. Moreover, 
the actual classes were not always suited to the 
needs of the customer. North Dakota wheat could 
not be blended with other kinds of wheat to 
precisely fit the needs of some customers, since the 
whole idea of the Pool was to sell identity- 
preserved wheat. Also, some buyers were looking 
for a gluten content different from that found in the 
North Dakota classes.
The advantage of the identity-preserved wheat 
offered by the Pool was that some countries 
preferred to buy wheat directly from the 
producers. A case in point was Iraq, which prefers 
to deal directly with farmer groups.
Competition
The North Dakota Wheat Pool encountered two 
types of competition. The first was the competition 
from other members of the same marketing 
channel in which the Pool operated. This competi 
tion was not direct, however, since most of the 
other pools dealt with different types of identity- 
preserved wheat. Also, there were not many of 
these pools in active operation during the North 
Dakota Pool's existence. Generally speaking, these 
pools have been neither very successful nor very 
active recently.
The other type of competition was from more 
traditional sources. These were the producers who 
were represented by export companies both in the 
United States and in other countries. Such concerns 
included the multinational trading corporations, 
farmer cooperatives, and government bodies such 
as the Canadian Wheat Board. In addition there 
were various intermediaries operating on behalf of 
these organizations or institutions, for instance 
brokers and agents. These organizations 
represented the most severe competition facing 
the Pool. It is evident that most of these competitors 
enjoyed (and still enjoy) a wide range of advantages 
over the pools, although the latter have, in turn, 
some competitive strengths.
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Marketing
As indicated earlier, the Poors marketing 
operations were delegated to other organizations. 
The result was a fragmented marketing picture, 
which is understandable since the Pool chose to 
have no marketing resources of its own. No 
marketing expertise was available to the Pool on a 
full-time basis.
Information. The Pool's broker and represen 
tatives of the other nonprofit organizations 
previously mentioned were the major sources of 
marketing information. These individuals obtained 
data concerning the nature of the tenders available 
for bid, as well as information regarding finalized 
transactions, actual bid prices, and the quality and 
conditions of sales. Market prices as well as market 
sizes for certain areas were also utilized by officials 
representing the Pool. The information collected 
was similar to but not as extensive as that regularly 
obtained and utilized by multinational U.S. grain 
exporters, and groups such as the Canadian Wheat 
Board.
Since the Pool did not employ a marketing 
specialist, it had no option but to call on outside 
agencies, such as the North Dakota State Wheat 
Commission and the others listed, for assistance. 
Fortunately, the Pool's needs were not as 
widespread or intensive as those of its larger 
competitors. On the other hand, it faced unique 
problems in attempting to identify smaller con 
sumers who might be interested in identity- 
preserved wheat of superior quality, but higher 
price.
Sales initiation. As indicated, one of the tasks of 
the providers of the marketing information was to 
identify representatives of potential buyers. The 
Pool then followed up on this information. Also, 
officials of the North Dakota State Mill participated 
in a North Dakota trade mission to the Middle East, 
where further contacts for the Pool were establish 
ed.
Since the Pool was a unique concern with special 
needs, Pool officials discovered various problems 
during their negotiations with potential buyers. 
The Pool attempted to organize several small 
foreign mills into a buying cooperative. Such an 
arrangement would have ensured a regular 
demand for the pool's wheat. However, the pool 
found that the limited amount of durum available 
was insufficient to meet the demand of such a 
cooperative. Consequently the arrangement fell 
through.
Depending on market conditions, either the 
wheat seller or buyer may initiate negotiations. 
Because the pool was not well known and was 
attempting to sell a unique product, those 
representing it had to be especially energetic in 
their marketing efforts. The extra effort compen 
sated, to some extent, for the Pool's relatively 
unknown position.
Promotion. Promotion of the Pool's wheat was 
part of the general promotion campaigns under 
taken by Great Plains Wheat Inc., Western Wheat 
Associates, and their affiliates, such as the North 
Dakota Wheat Commission. The operations of 
these groups include many of the major efforts 
made to promote the export marketing of U.S. 
wheat in general. It is not possible to separate from 
these marketing efforts those that directly 
benefited the North Dakota Wheat Pool. However, 
it may be useful to discuss the general promotional 
activities undertaken.
Marketing groups such as these tend to 
emphasize two types of promotional activities. The 
first type consists of "macro" promotional ac 
tivities, which are intended to benefit trade in 
general. These would include promotion of 
international trade policies which would create 
favorable marketing conditions. The second type 
consists of "m icro" or more specific management- 
oriented promotion operations. These include 
direct promotional activities, consumer promo 
tion, official contacts, and technical assistance.
Although some of these promotional operations 
no doubt benefited the Pool, it is very difficult to
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ascertain to what extent. Here again, the Pool was at 
a disadvantage in that these promotional activities 
are usually not geared to the promotion of identity- 
preserved wheat. On the other hand, the Pool did 
benefit from the same expertise that is also utilized 
by the multinational grain trading companies. 
Canada enjoys a more centralized promotional 
effort through the activities of the Canadian 
International Grain Institute. If a substantial 
amount of identity-preserved wheat were available 
for marketing, it is conceivable that marketing 
groups such as those described here could mount 
successful specific promotional campaigns.
Price. As a result of the relatively high quality and 
higher price of the Pool's wheat, some segments of 
the market were not utilized. Large-volume 
programs, such as the Food For Peace Program, 
which required large volume and low price, were 
not interested in the Pool's wheat, other than the 
durum purchase mentioned earlier.
The Pool's wheat prices were determined on the 
futures market. While no advance payment was 
required, no outstanding debts remained at the 
completion of the Pool's period of active opera 
tion. Payments were made in U.S. dollars to the 
Bank of North Dakota, a state bank. Sales were 
f.o.b., which meant that no price figuring was 
necessary for insurance or foreign transportation.
It appears that the overall average price obtained 
for Pool wheat was comparable to the prevailing 
market price. An issue of crucial importance in 
determining the Pool's effectiveness is whether the 
Pool realized a higher net return for its farmers than 
they would have obtained through alternative 
marketing channels. While the experience of this 
limited experiment is not conclusive, the Pool's net 
return was somewhat lower. A true test of the Pool's 
effectiveness would have occurred if the time 
period of its operation had been extended, the 
volume of wheat available to it had been substan 
tially increased, and perhaps more classes of wheat 
had been made available.
Distribution. The Pool owned no distribution 
facilities, and rented them from private companies. 
The Pool directed the flow of wheat from farmer to 
elevator, or directly from the farmer to a terminal at 
Duluth, Minnesota. All Pool wheat was shipped 
from Duluth, and the Pool rented storage facilities 
there from a private concern.
Storage costs were relatively high, due in part to 
the low volume of wheat handled and because 
special storage arrangements had to be made to 
preserve the high quality wheat. Foreign logistics, 
as stated earlier, were not the Pool's concern.
However, this also adversely affected sales, since 
some potential foreign buyers did not have 
adequate storage facilities. It appears that com 
panies and cooperatives owning their own facilities 
had a distinct advantage over the Pool.
Customer service. Since the Pool's marketing 
operations were handled by the nonprofit 
promotional institutions mentioned earlier, the 
services offered to its customers were identical to 
those offered by all U.S. wheat exporters. These 
included general consumer education, assistance 
in understanding the U.S. wheat handling and 
grading system, and reports on the wheat's quality 
characteristics. Also offered was specific technical 
assistance, including technical and marketing 
consultants and formal training facilities.
Conclusions
The North Dakota Wheat Pool ceased active 
operation in August 1977. The steering committee 
remains, but currently there are no plans for the 
Pool to become operational again.
The Pool faced a number of handicaps during its 
existence, many of which have already been 
mentioned. These include the limited price range 
which resulted from the high quality wheat classes 
offered for sale, the impossibility of obtaining 
compensating higher margins on the lease of 
facilities, freight cost disadvantages, and relatively 
higher administrative, storage, and handling costs.
Many of the drawbacks of this system stemmed 
from the identity-preserved character of the 
product offered by the Pool. Buyers did express 
interest in the quality of the wheat, and were, in a 
number of instances, highly complimentary. 
However, a number of market segments could not 
be satisfied because the wheat had to be identity- 
preserved.
One of the problems was that durum grown in 
the United States generally is not of the precise 
gluten strength that many buyers desire. Much 
North Dakota durum is of especially high gluten 
strength. As a result these buyers tend to prefer 
durum from Argentina and Canada. This made 
marketing difficult for the Pool, since durum was 
one of its two major products.
The Pool's competitors enjoyed several advan 
tages. Most could utilize wheat of multiple origin, 
that is, they utilized wheat from other states or 
countries, blending to satisfy their customers' 
needs. The Pool, by its nature, could not do this.
Identity-preserved wheat requires special ship 
ping and handling. The Pool's wheat could not be
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blended with other varieties for transporting and 
storage. Also, the relatively low volume of wheat 
marketed meant that per-unit shipping and storage 
costs were higher.
The lack of a sizable supply of wheat available to 
the Pool was a fundamental handicap. Large buyers 
could not be assured of sufficient quantities to suit
“ There has been little emphasis 
in Montana on the marketing of 
identity-preserved wheat.”
their needs. Also, since the Pool was experimental, 
no guarantees could be made to buyers regarding 
future delivery. Long-term contracts could not be 
negotiated.
As was pointed out earlier, the Pool also suffered 
because it offered no supplementary marketing 
functions. Its storage facilities were rented, thus 
increasing costs. Smaller buyers, with no storage or 
distribution facilities, could not be accommodated.
Finally, the Pool did not have its own marketing 
staff. It relied on the assistance of personnel from 
other institutions. These people all had additional 
duties and could not devote a majority of their time 
solely to the Pool's unique marketing problems.
The Pool did enjoy some advantages. The more 
direct marketing concept did enable it, in theory at 
least, to be in closer contact with the consumer. 
Some buyers, especially some foreign 
governments, prefer to deal directly with farmer 
groups. The fact that the Pool's wheat was identity- 
preserved meant that the wheat required special 
handling. Therefore, there was less chance of the 
wheat's quality deteriorating while in transit.
As a result of the North Dakota Wheat Pool 
experience, the North Dakota Department of 
Agriculture reexamined the marketing strategies 
utilized by groups such as North Dakota State Mill 
and Elevator. The high transportation costs borne 
by the Pool pointed out the need for a concerted 
effort to reduce freight rates. The state is currently 
planning a system of grain sub-terminals, similar to 
the system being studied in Montana.
One objective of the Pool was to obtain for its 
members a higher net price. However, during the 
time of the operation, those producers who 
participated received a lower net price than those 
operating through more traditional marketing 
channels. The Pool's operations were limited. No 
final judgment can be passed on the viability of a 
wheat pool as an alternative export marketing
channel until the scope of such an operation has 
been expanded.
The Montana Situation
During the first half of the century, Montana, like 
North Dakota, was the home of several 
organizations which advocated cooperative 
agricultural marketing efforts. The Nonpartisan 
League had a strong following in the eastern part of 
the state, particularly during the drought which 
swept the Great Plains beginning in 1917. However, 
the League's influence dissipated in Montana due 
to a number of factors. Many of Montana's farmers 
simply left the state during those hard years. Also, 
the League's focus in Montana had been on 
facilitating a more equitable system of taxation 
rather than on state-owned banks and mills. 
Montana, therefore, never had the state-owned 
facilities which were instrumental in the North 
Dakota Wheat Pool venture.
There has been little emphasis in Montana on the 
marketing of identity-preserved wheat. The state's 
growers produce numerous classes of wheat (hard 
red winter, dark northern spring, soft white, and 
some durum), whereas many North Dakota farmers 
produce large quantities of hard red spring wheat. 
This wheat is of exceptionally high quality (it is 
considered to be the "Cadillac of wheat"), and is 
perhaps more suitable for identity-preserved 
marketing. Also, Montana's large land mass makes 
transportation of any product especially expensive; 
the additional costs incurred due to identity- 
preservation would be prohibitive.
Currently, Montana's Department of 
Agriculture, like its North Dakota counterpart, is 
attempting to aid wheat producers by designing a 
system of grain sub-terminals. This system would 
include centralized collection points and storage 
facilities. The railroads' unit trains would need to 
make fewer stops to load Montana grain, which 
would lower the total costs of transportation.
Another aid to the Montana wheat grower is the 
newly-formed U.S. Wheat Associates, which was 
established in January 1980 through the merger of 
Great Plains Wheat Inc. and Western Wheat 
Associates. Montana had been a member of 
Western Wheat Associates since 1969. The new 
organization represents thirteen U.S. wheat 
producing states, and is funded by them. Through 
this organization and the proposed system of grain 
sub-terminals, both North Dakota and Montana are 
attempting to help wheat farmers increase their net 
return. E
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Several years ago I talked about the principles of 
age structure analysis and discussed some of its 
implications for Montana. This turned out to be a 
very popular topic. I would like to return to this 
topic, present some of the updated figures, and 
once again discuss future demographic trends.
Before looking at the new figures, it may be 
helpful to review some of the principles of age 
structure analysis. The underlying technique is very 
simple; the population at a future time consists 
mostly of persons already alive, except that they will 
be five, ten, or twenty years older. For example, as 
shown in figure 1, based on standard mortality 
tables, a group of 1,000 thirty-five year olds in 1980 
will yield about 987 forty-year olds in 1985, and 967 
forty-five year olds in 1990.
Montana's population will be used to illustrate 
some of the other features of age structure analysis. 
Figure 2 shows the age distribution of Montana 
residents as reported in the 1970 Census. The most 
striking feature of this graph—and the aspect to 
which we will return again and again—is the 
"bulge" in the number of persons aged five to 
twenty-four years old. This is the "postwar baby 
crop." There is some disagreement among the 
experts as to the exact beginning and end of this 
phenomenon; for our purposes, we will include all 
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definition, the postwar baby crop in Montana 
consisted of 273,000 persons aged five to twenty- 
four years old in 1970. This compares to a total 
population of 684,409 that year. In other words, the 
postwar baby crop accounted for approximately 39 
percent of Montana’s 1970 population. This age 
group is an important segment of the state’s 
population.
Looking at the data in figure 2, we can easily 
identify some of the major events during the past 
decades. Notice the plateau corresponding to the 
thirty to fifty-nine year olds. Based only on average 
life expectancies, we would expect relatively more 
younger persons (thirty to forty-four year olds) than 
older persons (forty-five to fifty-nine year olds) in 
this group. But, the unsettled conditions in the late 
twenties, the Great Depression, and World War II 
all led to an unusually small number of births 
between 1925 and 1940, which in turn resulted in 
the relatively few persons in the thirty to forty-four
14
year old bracket in 1970. Beginning about 1946, 
there was a sharp increase in births and the ensuing 
baby boom continued for about twenty years. 
Finally, recent concerns about family size, the 
emphasis on contraception, and other events 
during the middle and late sixties led to a sharp 
decline in births and a corresponding decrease in 
children less than nine years old during 1970.
Future age distributions may be estimated by 
beginning with the 1970 population and applying 
the mortality rates discussed earlier. Figure 3 
illustrates the age distribution of Montana's 
population during the year 2000. It pictures the 
inevitable aging of the population; the bulge in the 
population graph is now centered on the thirty-five 
to fifty-four year olds, as compared to the five to 
twenty-four year olds in 1970. In other words, in the 
year 2000 the postwar baby crop will be middle 
aged. Another interesting feature is the second 
bulge of persons twenty-four years old and 
younger. This corresponds to a projected increase 
in births after 1975, and reflects the children of the 
postwar baby crop. Even if each of today's couples 
would have only two children, the increase in the 
number of persons in the child-bearing age would 
result in a rise in the number of births. Even though 
the births per person stay the same, there will be a 
sharp rise in the number of persons in the child 
bearing age brackets.
When I first mentioned the possibility of an 
increase in births several years ago, it was only a 
projection. But the latest data suggest that it may
Figure 1
Estimated Five and Ten Year Survivors
for a Group of Thirty-Five Year Olds
Figure 2
Age Distribution of the Population 
Montana, 1970
become a reality. The number of births in Montana 
is shown in table 1. Notice that after reaching a 
trough in 1975, the number of births has risen each 
year. The estimate of 13,897 for 1979 is almost 15 
percent above the 1975 figure, but still well below 
the peak of 18,000 during 1957. Notice also that 
there have been some minor ups and downs in the 
figures. For example, there was a decline from 1967 
to 1969—and then a minor upturn in 1970 and 1971, 
and then a downturn in 1972 and 1973. So, even 
though births have increased every year since 1975, 
we still should be a little cautious about the second 
baby boom.
We are not yet able to assess the size of the 
second baby crop; it depends on the trend in the 
fertility rate. If the current low birth rates continue, 
or even decline further, the increase in births may
Figure 3
Projected Age Distribution of the Population 
Assuming No Net Migration 
Montana, 2000
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only be a minor blip in the graph. On the other 
hand, if the birth rate stops its decline, the second 
bulge in the population graph may come close to 
matching the first. And there are some good 
reasons for believing that the birth rate may stop 
declining. First of all, the current low birth rate may 
reflect a postponement of births, rather than a 
decision to have no children (and we won't know 
this until those in the postwar baby crop complete 
their child-bearing years). In addition, some 
experts believe that the social trends causing low 
fertility may have bottomed out. No one believes 
that we will return to the high birth years of the 
1950s, but there are good reasons to believe that the 
birth rates will not decline indefinitely.
Housing patterns and “no growth”
Turning to a different topic, age structure analysis 
provides some very useful insights into one of the 
most explosive and controversial topics facing local 
governments, the problems of mushrooming 
subdivisions and the resulting attempts to legislate
Table 2
Homeowning Households Per One 
Thousand Population, by Age Group 
United States, 1975
Age o f  Head
H ouseholds Per 
One Thousand 







"no growth." Beginning about 1970, people began 
to worry about a proliferation in the number of 
subdivisions and accompanying urban sprawl. 
Many persons viewed the increased demand for 
housing as being caused by new residents— 
persons moving into a community from 
somewhere else. As a result, some communities 
attempted to halt the inmigration and adopted "no 
growth" policies.
Unfortunately, the "no growth" policies were 
misdirected. For the most part, new residents were 
not responsible for this housing demand. Rather, it 
was young adults, those born during the postwar 
years who were growing up, moving out of their 
parents' homes, and establishing their own 
households. To get some idea of the magnitude of 
the problem, imagine 100 households, each with a 
teenage son or daughter. For convenience, let's say 
there are fifty boys and fifty girls. They marry, and 
form fifty new households. This represents a 50 
percent increase in the demand for housing, with 
absolutely no change in population.
We can also get an idea of what is in store for us in 
the next few years. Table 2 shows the proportion of 
homeowning households in each age bracket. 
There are no statistics as to exactly what type of 
homes they are, but typically, home owners live in 
single family dwellings as opposed to apartments or 
other multifamily dwellings. Notice that the home 
ownership rate rises rapidly during the early family 
formation years—from about 13 percent among the 
very young to 45 percent for those in their twenties 
and thirties. The real peak in home ownership is not 
reached until very late in the family cycle; about 76 
percent of those in their fifties and sixties owned 
their own home in 1975.
These data indicate that the real housing boom— 
at least for single family dwellings—is yet to come. 
The oldest of the postwar baby crop—those born in 
the late forties and early fifties—are about thirty. 
They are just entering the prime years of home 
ownership. The large numbers born in the late 
fifties and sixties are just beginning to enter the 
family formation years.
I think much of the concern about local 
economic growth and the push for "no growth" 
policies may be a misdirected reaction to the 
postwar baby crop. Many of the indicators which 
formerly measured economic growth are now 
biased by the changing age structure. For example, 
an increase in traffic does not necessarily mean 
more people—just more cars and more drivers. 
And this may be caused by the postwar baby crop 
obtaining driver's licenses—rather than by new





people moving in. Most communities here in 
Montana have continued to experience net 
inmigration during the 1970s, but at about the same 
rate as during the 1960s. The real culprits making 
the 1970s look different from the 1960s have been 
the postwar baby crop and the changing age 
structure of the population.
All of this does not mean that there aren't a few 
communities scattered around the country which 
have experienced significant inmigration, such as 
Colorado Springs and San Jose. But, much of the 
excitement about runaway growth is probably 
unnecessary. For the most part, communities are 
not growing any faster now than they did ten years 
ago—it just seems that way because the postwar 
baby crop has affected some of our traditional 
measures of local economic growth.
Employment
The changing age structure of the population will 
have impacts throughout the economy. For exam 
ple, it will even affect the internal personnel and 
hiring practices of large companies. One important 
goal of personnel policies is to insure the continued 
flow of talent into and upward within a company. 
The small birth years will mean correspondingly 
reduced college graduating classes, and increased 
competition by corporate recruiters for a dwin 
dling supply of talented persons. Some firms may 
be tempted to reduce their hiring of young people. 
This in turn may lead to a serious shortage of 
qualified middle management persons fifteen or 
twenty years from now.
Table 3
Projected Population, by Age Croup 
United States
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On the other hand, many firms have taken 
advantage of the recent oversupply of well-trained 
college graduates and hired many of the postwar 
baby crop. In a few years, the most talented and 
ambitious will expect to advance into management 
positions; there may not be enough to go around. 
Firms will have to decide if they want to retain those 
persons and perhaps create additional manage 
ment jobs, or face the possibility that they may 
leave in search of greater rewards and oppor 
tunities.
Future trends
Table 3 shows the projected population, by age 
group, for the United States. Even though there will 
be some differences between Montana and the 
United States, the general trends will be similar and 
we can discuss the future age distribution with a 
considerable degree of confidence.
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Age Groups: What to Expect in the Future
Infants (0-4 years old). Big items among this age 
group are diapers, baby food, and nursery school. 
This age group decreased in size during the 
seventies (and caused a decrease in demand for 
baby shampoo and baby powder, which were then 
advertised for other uses.) Their number will rise 
during the eighties and early nineties as a result of 
the second baby boom.
School age children (5-14 years old). They are 
concerned with junk food, clothing fads, and 
teenage idols. After a sharp decline during the 
seventies, this group is projected to increase 
modestly through the eighties and nineties.
Young adults (15 to 24 years old). Many of these 
individuals will be in college or at their first job, and 
probably living away from home. The sharp rise 
during the seventies will be followed by an equally 
precipitous decline in the eighties. There will be 
only modest growth between 1990 and 2000.
Young families (25-34 years old). They are at the 
start of their careers, many have young children, 
and may be in the market for a house or a larger 
apartment. Rapid growth during the seventies will 
be followed by a more modest rise in the eighties, 
and a sharp decline in the nineties.
Mature families (35-44 years old). These are 
people with established careers; the wife is likely to 
be working, and there are children in school. This 
age group is currently increasing moderately. Their 
numbers will mushroom between 1980 and 1990, 
and then grow more slowly from 1990 to 2000.
Middle age (45-64 years old). These are the years 
of peak earnings (often with two wage earners). 
They are the most affluent families as more wives 
enter the labor market and the expensive child 
raising years are past. This age group will increase 
moderately throughout the latter portion of the 
century.
Senior citizens (65 and over). These are persons in 
retirement. They may travel, and often require 
medical care. Due to social security, pensions, and 
personal investments, this age group will be more 
secure than in the past. Senior citizens will increase 
rapidly in the seventies and eighties with a 
moderate growth during the nineties. The postwar 
baby crop will not begin to enter this age group 
until after the year 2000. □
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Economists' Notebook is a new column which will appear regularly in the Quarterly. Staff 
members of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research are constantly coming across 
lists of economic information which they find interesting. This column will offer them the 
opportunity to pass some of the data or ideas on to our readers.
Per Capita Taxes, 1978
N^ontanans paid an average of $817 per person in 
state and local taxes in fiscal year 1978, according to 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Residents of twenty- 
three states paid larger amounts; the average for all 
fifty states was $888 (table 1).
To better measure the tax burden, taxes are 
frequently related to personal income. Because 
their per capita incomes are lower than in many 
states, Montanans do not fare as well when this 
comparison is made. In 1978, they paid $138 in state 
and local taxes for every $1,000 in personal income, 
compared to a national average of $128 per $1,000 
income. Residents of only ten states paid a higher 
proportion of their incomes in state and local taxes.
There should be some consolation for Montana 
residents in knowing that their tax position vis-a-vis 
other Americans has improved in the past ten years. 
Between 1968 and 1978, state and local taxes per 
$1,000 of personal income increased an average of 
19 percent nationally, and just 14 percent in 
Montana.
Dependence On Federal Funds
How dependent are state and local governments 
in Montana on federal funds? More dependent 
than governments in many other states. In fiscal 
1978, total general revenue per capita in Montana 
(excluding liquor store and insurance trust 
revenues) amounted to $1,559. Of that amount, 30 
percent came from the federal government, 52 
percent from state and local taxes, and 18 percent 
from charges such as fees and rents and from 
investment income and special assessments (e.g., 
special improvement district revenues). Only one
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Tax Comparison, Montana 
and the Fifty States1
state, Vermont, obtained a higher proportion of its 
general revenue from the federal government (32 
percent); two other states, Arkansas and Mississip 
pi, received the same proportion—30 percent—as 
Montana.
The fifty states combined received just 22 percent 
of their total general revenue from federal sources, 
and raised more of their revenue from taxes (61 
percent) (table 2).
How Montana Spends Its Money
Per capita expenditures by Montana state and 
local governments amounted to $1,515 in fiscal 
1978. Where did the money go?
Forty-two percent of total expenditures per 
person went for education; another 17 percent 
went for transportation, mostly for highways. 
Montana state and local governments spent 
substantially more per capita for both these services 
than did their counterparts in other states.
In education, the difference occurred mostly in 
expenditures for local schools. Only Alaska ex 
ceeded Montana's per capita expenditure for 
public elementary and secondary schools. Natural 
resources and parks and governmental administra 
tion also were more heavily funded in Montana.
On the other hand, Montana governments spent 
considerably less per capita than most other states 
for public welfare, health and hospitals, interest on 
debt, and police services (table 3).
Table 3
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Montanans’ Per Capita Income
Although the Rocky Mountain states as a whole 
experienced a significant average annual gain in 
per capita income from 1969 to 1979, Montana 
continues to rank at the lower end of the national 
income scale. According to information released 
recently by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Montana ranked 
thirty-eighth among the fifty states in per capita 
personal income in 1979, with a figure of $7,400. 
Alaska ranked first, with per capita income of over 
$11,000.
The measure used is ''personal income." This 
consists of wages, salaries and the income of the 
self-employed, plus dividends, interest, and rent 
income. Social security, welfare and other transfer 
payments are also included.
The ten poorest states in per capita income in 
1979 were Mississippi (lowest, at just over $6,000), 
Arkansas, Alabama, South Carolina, Maine, Utah, 
Vermont, New Mexico, Tennessee, and South 
Dakota. The top ten states were Alaska, Nevada, 
Connecticut, California, Illinois, New Jersey, 
Wyoming, Delaware, Washington, and Hawaii.
From 1969 to 1979, the southwestern and Rocky 
Mountain states showed a faster income growth 
than the other areas of the country. However, until 
the 1970s, per capita income in the western states 
tended to lag behind that of the eastern states. So, 
despite the high rate of increase in the past ten 
years, the 1979 average annual per capita income in 
the Rocky Mountain states of $8,200 still ranked 
below the $8,700 national average. Montana's 
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Table 4
States of the northern Rocky Mountain region 
showed a substantial gain in population since 1970, 
according to U.S. Census Bureau estimates. 
However, within the region, Montana's gain was 
the lowest (table 4).
Using 1970 Census figures, and the Census 
Bureau's 1979 provisional estimates, population in 
the northern Rocky Mountain states increased 
from 5,008,000 to 6,280,000, a total gain of 25 
percent. Wyoming showed the largest increase, 36 
percent, followed by Utah's gain of 29 percent, 
Idaho's increase of 27 percent, and Colorado's 
increase of 25 percent. Montana ranked last in the 
region, with a population increase of 13 percent.
The U.S. population as a whole increased 8 
percent during these years. Of the 21 states located 
in the Midwest and New England, only one. New 
Hampshire, showed a percentage population gain 
greater than Montana's. Nationally, the greatest 
gains were recorded in the Sun Belt states. Highest
Population, Rocky Mountain States1
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in the U.S. was Nevada's gain of 43 percent. 
Population declined in New York, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, and Washington, D.C. □
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GOLD: THE BEGINNING OF MODERN-DAY MONTANA
MARY L. LENIHAN
o n January 21 this year, the price of gold on the 
international market peaked at $875 per ounce. 
While the price has since declined, the recent 
activity in the gold market reminds us of that 
metal's continuing importance. Montanans are 
reminded, too, that gold provided the catalyst for 
the emergence of modern-day Montana.
In 1848, when gold was discovered in California, 
gold fever became an American epidemic. From 
California, miners filtered eastward to Colorado 
and Nevada and north to Oregon and Washington. 
Montana, remote and rugged, remained un 
investigated. Fur trappers had operated in the area, 
and a few white settlements existed. But by as late as 
1863, still an unorganized territory, Montana had a 
white population of only about 670 persons, mostly 
men.
By October 1864, however, the yellow metal had 
performed its magic. In the first election held in the 
newly created Montana Territory, 6,866 votes were 
cast. Presuming those votes were cast by white 
males, in one year that segment of the population 
had increased by an amazing 1,000 percent. The 
reason? Gold.
The first gold discovery officially recorded in 
Montana was made in 1858. A party of miners. 
Midwest-bound after disappointing diggings in the 
California gold fields, found gold in a creek near 
present-day Drummond. The creek was named, 
naturally. Gold Creek. But this early discovery did 
not precipitate a rush. No “ mother lode" was 
discovered at that, the first of many “ Gold Creeks" 
to be so named in Montana.
In 1862, a minor gold rush occurred when a
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successful placer operation was begun at 
Grasshopper Creek, a tributary of the Beaverhead 
River. Bannack, Montana's first gold boom town, 
was the result. But the real rush was yet to come.
An early pioneer, Robert Vaughan, wrote that 
“ there is no animal on earth that will stampede 
quicker, keep on going with the same stubbornness 
and determination, as a fortune hunter; they are 
worse than Texas cattle." And so it was in the spring 
of 1863, when a prospecting party from Bannack 
discovered gold at Alder Gluch, near the Madison 
Valley.
By 1865, more than 10,000 whites (and some 
Chinese and blacks) had crowded into the 
area. These fortune hunters came from all parts of 
the country. A sizable number had tried mining first 
in the other western states. Others arrived directly 
from the Midwest, East, and South. The nation was 
in the midst of the Civil War, and many young men 
preferred the uncertainties of the gold fields to that 
of the battlefields. Myths still abound in Montana 
concerning the supposed influx of Confederate 
deserters to Montana's gold fields.
Regardless of their background, the miners 
crowded into settlements such as Virginia City and 
Nevada City. Now preserved, and two of the state's
premiere tourist attractions, these cities were little 
more than rough camps at first; with increased 
wealth, however, came sophistication. Frame 
buildings were constructed, trade routes 
materialized, merchants arrived, and soon 
churches, schools, bars, bawdy houses, literary 
societies, libraries, and the other attendant signs of 
civilization appeared. Though these cities were 
eventually abandoned (their mines produced $40 
million in gold by 1868), their creation was the 
foundation of permanent white settlement in the 
state.
A second major Montana gold strike was 
uncovered in 1864. A party known as the “ Four 
Georgians" (though only one, it seems, was actually 
from Georgia) left Virginia City to investigate 
reports of gold in the Kootenai River country. After 
traveling as far west as Hellgate Canyon, near 
Missoula, and turning back upon hearing dis 
couraging reports, they headed for the Prickly Pear 
Valley. They found gold, moved north to find more, 
and, finding none, returned to try their first strike at 
Prickly Pear once more. It was, they figured, their 
“ last chance."
This strike proved to be enormous. Returning to 
Virginia City for supplies, the group was followed
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back to the Prickly Pear by the usual horde of 
hopeful gold seekers. Nicknamed “ Last Chance 
Gulch/' the strike and its surrounding camp 
mushroomed into the city of Helena. Gold strikes in 
that area eventually produced nearly $20 million.
After Helena, Confederate Gulch and Diamond 
City boomed, beginning in 1865. These mines 
produced another $10 million in gold. By 1866, gold 
production in Montana ranked second only to 
California's. Prospectors found additional claims in 
an area stretching from the upper reaches of the 
Yellowstone River to the Clark Fork. Altogether, 
Montana's mines had produced a total of $92 
million in gold by 1868.
Placer mines quickly exhausted the surface 
deposits, and by the end of the 1860s hydraulic 
mining and other more technologically advanced 
methods were in use. Gold deposits often lie in 
proximity to silver and copper; by the 1870s the 
gold furor had dissipated somewhat and silver and 
copper mining began in earnest. But it was the 
initial search for gold which launched Montana 
into its first industrial age.
Montana's history is filled with stories from the 
gold years. Some of the more interesting describe 
the Chinese, who panned their washwater after 
laundering the miners' clothes; the stock boys in 
the general stores, who sifted the contents of their 
dustpans at day's end; and the successful miners 
who could not ride to a neighboring valley without 
causing a minor exodus of those sure that a new 
strike had been uncovered. Mostly, Montana's 
gold fields attracted hard working people who took 
enormous risks to seek riches. A few succeeded, 
but many more did not. Of these, some departed to 
seek their fortune elsewhere. But many stayed, and 
became the ranchers, farmers, loggers, 
shopkeepers and financiers who ushered Montana 
into the twentieth century. □
 , , Montana Business Quarterly.
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